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We introduce imperfect creditor protection in a multi-country version of Schumpeterian growth
theory with technology transfer. The theory predicts that the growth rate of any country with more
than some critical level of financial development will converge to the growth rate of the world
technology frontier, and that all other countries will have a strictly lower long-run growth rate. The
theory also predicts that in a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, financial
development has a positive but eventually vanishing effect on steady-state per-capita GDP relative
to the frontier. We present cross-country evidence supporting these two implications. In particular,
we find a significant and sizeable effect of an interaction term between initial per-capita GDP
(relative to the United States) and a financial intermediation measure in an otherwise standard
growth regression, implying that the likelihood of converging to the U.S. growth rate increases with
financial development. We also find that, as predicted by the theory, the direct effect of financial
intermediation in this regression is not significantly different from zero. These findings are robust





















david.mayer@cide.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most current theories of the cross-country distribution of per-capita income imply that
all countries share the same long-run growth rate (of TFP or per-capita GDP). Yet the
historical record shows that growth rates can diﬀer substantially across countries for long
periods of time. For example, Pritchett (1997) estimates that the proportional gap in per-
capita GDP between the richest and poorest countries grew more than ﬁve-fold from 1870
to 1990, and according to the tables in Maddison (2001) the proportional gap between the
richest group of countries and the poorest1 grew from 3 in 1820 to 19 in 1998.
The “great divergence” between rich and poor countries continued through the end of
the twentieth century. Although many studies2 show that a large group of rich and middle-
income countries have been converging to parallel growth paths over the past 50 years or so,
the gap between these countries as a whole and the very poorest countries as a whole has
continued to widen. For example, the proportional gap in per-capita GDP between Mayer-
Foulkes’s (2002) richest and poorest convergence groups grew by a factor of 2.6 between
1960 and 1995, and the proportional gap between Maddison’s richest and poorest groups
grew by a factor of 1.75 between 1950 and 1998.
Technology appears to be the central factor underlying divergence. Easterly and Levine
(2001) estimate that about 60% of the cross-country variation in growth rates of per-capita
GDP is attributable to diﬀerences in productivity growth, while Klenow and Rodríguez-
Clare (1997) estimate that in their sample about 90% of the variation is attributable to
diﬀerences in productivity growth. Feyrer (2001) ﬁnds that although the distribution of
capital-output ratios is single-peaked, and the distribution of education levels is almost
ﬂat, the distribution of the productivity residual has become increasingly twin-peaked.
Although the level of productivity can be aﬀected by many factors other than technology,
such as geography and institutions that aﬀect the eﬃciency of resource allocation, it is
hard to see how substantial diﬀerences in the growth rate of productivity persisting for
such long periods of time can be accounted for by these other factors, which are themselves
highly persistent over time. Instead it seems more likely that divergence reﬂects long-lasting
cross-country diﬀerences in rates of technological progress.
These facts are especially puzzling when one takes into account the possibility of in-
ternational technology transfer and the “advantage of backwardness” (Gerschenkron 1952)
that it confers on technological laggards. That is, the further a country falls behind the
world’s technology leaders the easier it is for that country to progress technologically sim-
ply by implementing new technologies that have been discovered elsewhere. Eventually this
advantage should be enough to stabilize the proportional gap that separates it from the
leaders. This is what happens in neoclassical models that assume technology transfer is
instantaneous (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992), and even in models where technologies
developed on the frontier are not “appropriate” for poorer countries (Basu and Weil, 1998;
Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001), in models where technology transfer can be blocked by spe-
cial interests (Parente and Prescott, 1994, 1999) and in models where a country adopts
1The richest group was Western Europe in 1820 and the “European Oﬀshoots” (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the United States) in 1998. The poorest group was Africa in both years.
2For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Evans (1996).
1institutions that impede technology transfer (Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2002).3
This paper explores the hypothesis that ﬁnancial constraints prevent poor countries
from taking full advantage of technology transfer and that this is what causes some of them
to diverge from the growth rate of the world frontier. It introduces credit constraints into a
multi-country version of Schumpeterian growth theory with technology transfer,4 and shows
that the model implies a form of club convergence consistent with the broad facts outlined
above. In the theory, countries above some threshold level of ﬁnancial development will all
converge to the same long-run growth rate (but not generally to the same level of per-capita
GDP) and those below that threshold will have strictly lower long-run growth rates.
There are three key components to the theory. The ﬁrst starts with the recognition that
technology transfer is costly. The receiving country cannot just take foreign technologies oﬀ
the shelf and implement them costlessly. Instead, the country must make technology invest-
ments of its own to master foreign technologies and adapt them to the local environment,
because technological knowledge is often tacit and circumstantially speciﬁc.5 Although
these investments may not involve scientists and high tech labs, and hence would not ﬁt
the conventional deﬁnition of R&D, nevertheless they play much the same role as R&D in
an innovation-based growth model. That is, they generate new technological possibilities
in the country where they are conducted, building on knowledge that was created previ-
ously elsewhere. As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Griﬃth, Redding and Van Reenen
(2001) have argued, each act of technology transfer requires an innovation on the part of the
receiving country, and thus R&D or more generally technology investment is a necessary
input to the process of technology transfer. Accordingly our theory assigns to R&D the
role that Nelson and Phelps (1966) assumed was played by human capital, namely that of
determining a country’s “absorptive capacity”.6
The second key component is the assumption that as the global technology frontier ad-
vances, the size of investment required just in order to keep innovating at the same pace as
before rises in proportion. This assumption recognizes the force of increasing complexity,
which makes technologies increasingly diﬃcult to master and to adapt to local circum-
stances. A similar assumption has been shown elsewhere to be helpful in accounting for
the fact that productivity growth rates have remained stable in OECD countries over the
second half of the 20th Century despite the steady increase in R&D expenditures.7
The third key component is an agency problem that limits an innovator’s access to
external ﬁnance. Speciﬁcally we assume that an innovator can defraud her creditors by
hiding the results of a successful innovation, at a cost that depends positively on the level
3Other theories of endogenous growth (for example Lucas, 1988) generate diﬀerent long-run growth rates
for diﬀerent countries but only by ignoring the possibility of technology transfer.
4See Aghion and Howitt (1998), Howitt (2000), Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002), and Howitt
and Mayer-Foulkes (2002). The last of these papers implies three convergence groups, analogous to the
three groups of the present paper, but the disadvantage of backwardness that prevents some countries from
converging in that paper arises from low levels of human capital rather than from credit-market imperfections.
5See Arrow (1969) and Evenson and Westphal (1995).
6To the extent that R&D is human-capital intensive our theory can be seen as an elaboration of Nelson
and Phelps. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) also model technology
transfer as taking place through a costly investment process, which they portray as imitation; but in these
models technology transfer always leads to convergence in growth rates except in special cases studied by
Grossman and Helpman where technology transfer is inactive in a steady state.
7See Jones (1995) and Howitt (1999).
2of ﬁnancial development. Because of this, in equilibrium the innovator’s access to external
ﬁnance will be limited to some multiple of her own wage income, as in the theory of Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) modiﬁed by Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999). Since wages are
limited by domestic productivity, therefore a technological laggard can face a disadvantage
of backwardness that counteracts Gerschenkron’s advantage; that is, the further behind the
frontier it falls the less its innovators will be able to invest relative to what is required in
order to keep innovating at a given rate. The lower the level of ﬁnancial development in
the country the lower will be the (private) cost of fraud, hence the lower will be the credit
multiplier and the larger will be the associated disadvantage of backwardness. This is why
in our theory the likelihood that a country will converge to the frontier growth rate is an
increasing function of its level of ﬁnancial development.
Our paper relates to several important strands of theory relating growth, convergence
and ﬁnancial market development. There is ﬁrst the literature on poverty traps and inter-
personal convergence or divergence in economies with credit market imperfections, in partic-
ular, Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and
Piketty (1997). In these models8, all agents face the same production technology and, un-
like in our model, the same (productivity-adjusted) investment costs9, and what generates
poverty traps are either non-convexities in production or monitoring, or pecuniary external-
ities working through factor prices. However, there is no technical progress and therefore
no positive long-run growth in these models, which therefore cannot analyze the issue of
long term convergence in growth rates. A second strand analyzes the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
constraints and/or ﬁnancial intermediation on long-term growth. Thus, Greenwood and
Jovanovic (1990), Levine (1991), Bencivenga and Smith (1991, 1993), Saint-Paul (1992),
Sussman (1993), Harrison, Sussman and Zeira (1999) and Kahn (2001) analyze the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial intermediation on growth in an AK-style model with no distinction being made
between investing in technology and investing in physical or human capital accumulation.
Whereas King and Levine (1993), de la Fuente and Marin (1996), Galetovic (1996), Black-
burn and Hung (1998) and Morales (2003) consider the relationship between ﬁnance and
growth in the context of innovation-based growth models. De Gregorio (1996) studies the
eﬀects on growth of ﬁnancial constraints that inhibit human capital accumulation. Krebs
(2003) shows how imperfect sharing of individual human-capital risk can depress long-run
growth. However, none of these models analyzes the process of technology transfer that we
are focusing on, and therefore none of them is capable of addressing the question of why
technology transfer is not suﬃcient to put all countries on parallel long-run growth paths.
Our question is not just why ﬁnancial constraints make some countries poor but rather
why ﬁnancial constraints inhibit technological transfer and thus lead to an ever-increasing
technology gap.
The paper also produces evidence to support its main implications. There is already
a substantial body of evidence10 to the eﬀect that ﬁnancial development is an important
determinant of a country’s short-run growth rate, almost all of which is predicated on the
8See Banerjee (2003) for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
9In contrast, in our model countries face a productivity-adjusted cost of innovation which increases
with its distance to the technological frontier. It is this the interplay between credit constraints and this
technological heterogeneity which generates the possibility of long-term divergence.
10See the surveys by Levine (1997, 2003), and the book by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001).
3assumption of long-run convergence in growth rates. We extend this analysis to allow for the
possibility of diﬀerent long-run growth rates, using a cross section of 71 countries over the
period 1960-1995. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the eﬀect of an interaction term between initial
per-capita GDP (relative to the United States) and ﬁnancial development in an otherwise
standard cross-country growth regression. We interpret a negative coeﬃcient as evidence
that low ﬁnancial development makes convergence less likely. Using a measure of ﬁnancial
development ﬁrst introduced by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient
is indeed negative, and is large both statistically and economically.
Our empirical methodology is similar to that of Benhabib and Spiegel (2002), who found
a negative interaction term between initial TFP and schooling and concluded that schooling
was a key determinant of whether or not a country will converge to the frontier growth
rate. We test the robustness of our results by including both schooling and an interaction
term between the initial GDP gap and schooling as additional regressors in our equation.
In addition, we repeat this robustness test using instead of schooling 30 diﬀerent variables
suggested by other growth theories. In all cases the main implications of our theory pass the
test. We also present evidence to the eﬀect that the main channel through which ﬁnancial
development aﬀects convergence is productivity growth, as implied by the theory, rather
than capital accumulation, and show that our results are robust to elimination of outliers,
to alternative conditioning sets, to alternative estimation procedures and to alternative
measures of ﬁnancial development.
2 Theoretical framework
We follow Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002) in casting Schumpeterian growth theory
in a simple discrete-time framework. There are m countries, who do not exchange goods
or factors, but do make use of each others’ technological ideas. There is a continuum of
individuals in each country. Each country has a ﬁxed population L, which for notational
convenience we normalize to unity. Thus aggregate and per-capita quantities are identical.
Everyone lives for two periods, being endowed with two units of labor services in the ﬁrst
period and none in the second, with a utility function linear in consumption: U = c1 +βc2,
with 0 <β<1. Within each country the growth path is determined as follows.
2.1 The general sector
There is one multi-purpose “general” good, produced by labor and a continuum of special-






α di, 0 <α<1 (1)
where xt (i) is the input of the latest version of intermediate good i and At (i) is the pro-
ductivity parameter associated with it. The general good is used for consumption, as an
input to R&D and also as an input to the production of intermediate goods.
The general good is produced under perfect competition, so the price of each interme-







(We use the general good as numéraire, and L =1 ).
2.2 Intermediate sectors
For each intermediate good i there is one person born each period t − 1 who is capable of
producing an innovation for the next p e r i o d .T h i sp e r s o ni sc a l l e dt h eith innovator in t−1,
and if she succeeds (innovates) then she will be the ith incumbent in t. Let µt (i) be the
probability that she succeeds. Then:
At (i)=
½
At with probability µt (i)
At−1 (i) with probability 1 − µt (i)
¾
where At is the world technology frontier, which grows at the constant rate g, taken as
given for now. The fact that a successful innovator gets to implement At is a manifestation
of technology transfer, of the kind that Keller (2002) calls “active”; that is, domestic R&D
makes use of ideas developed elsewhere in the world.11
In each intermediate sector where an innovation has just occurred, the incumbent is
able to produce any amount of the intermediate good using as the sole input one unit of
the general good per unit of intermediate good. In addition, in every intermediate sector
there is an unlimited number of people capable of producing copies of the latest generation
of that intermediate good at a unit cost of χ>1.
So in sectors where an innovation has just occurred, the incumbent will be the sole
producer, at a price equal to the unit cost of the competitive fringe,12 whereas in non-
innovating sectors where the most recent incumbent is dead, production will take place
under perfect competition with a price equal to the unit cost of each producer. In either




1−α At (i). (3)
It follows that an unsuccessful innovator will earn zero proﬁts next period, whereas the









11In Appendix A we explore the more general case in which innovations do not result in an immediate
jump to the frontier, so that:
At (i)=
½
bAt +( 1− b)At−1 with probability µt (i)
At−1 (i) with probability 1 − µt (i)
¾
,
where At is the average domestic productivity at date t and b is a real number between 0 and 1.
12This requires the further assumption that χ<α
−α, which we now make.
5Substituting (3) into (1) we see that gross output of the general good will be:
Zt = ζAt
where ζ =( α/χ)
α
1−α.
In equilibrium the probability of innovation will be the same in each sector: µt (i)=µt
for all i; therefore average productivity evolves according to:
At = µtAt +( 1− µt)At−1.
That is, the productivity parameter will equal At in the fraction µt of sectors that innovated
at t−1, but will remain equal to At−1 (i) in the 1−µt sectors that did not innovate at t−1,
and since innovations are distributed randomly across sectors the average value of At−1 (i)
among non-innovating sectors will equal the economy-wide average At−1.
Deﬁne the country’s normalized productivity as:
at = At/At.
Normalized productivity is an inverse measure of the country’s distance to the technological
frontier, or its “technology gap”. It follows that the gap evolves according to:




Since the general sector is perfectly competitive, the wage rate wt will be the marginal
product of labor in producing the general good:
wt =( 1− α)Zt =( 1− α)ζAt. (5)
The fact that wt is proportional to domestic productivity At plays an important role in
what follows. For as we shall see it implies that technology investment in a country that is
credit-constrained will be strictly proportional to At.
Value added in the general sector is wage income, whereas value added in the interme-
diate sectors is proﬁt income. Per-capita income is the sum of value added in all sectors:
Yt = wt + µtπt =( 1− α)ζAt + µtπAt. (6)
2.4 Innovations
In each sector the R&D investment needed to innovate at any given rate µt is governed by
the cost function:





At η,δ > 0
where Nt−1 is the quantity of general good that must be invested. We multiply e n by At to
recognize the “ﬁshing-out” eﬀect; the further ahead the frontier moves the more diﬃcult it
is to innovate. This eﬀect is crucial in what follows.
Assume also that:
η<β π<η+ δ.
This condition guarantees that the probability µt will always lie strictly between 0 and 1.
In equilibrium µt will be chosen so as to maximize the expected net payoﬀ:
βµtπAt − e n(µt)At (7)
in each sector, subject to credit constraints.
62.5 Equilibrium innovation under perfect credit markets
In this section we show that if innovators had unlimited access to outside ﬁnance all
economies would converge to the same growth rate. The level of each country’s growth
path might be diﬀerent because of country-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in parameters such as β and
χ, but the world distribution of income would exhibit parallel convergence.
Suppose accordingly that each innovator can borrow (from other young people) unlim-
ited quantities at the going rate r = β−1 − 1 subject to a binding commitment to repay.




µ∗ =( βπ − η)/δ.








It follows from this and equation (4) that the country’s technology gap evolves according
to:
at+1 = µ∗ +
(1 − µ∗)
1+g
at ≡ F1 (at) (8)
which converges in the long run to the steady-state value:
a∗ =
(1 + g)µ∗
g + µ∗ ∈ (0,1).
Per-capita income in the steady state is:
Y ∗
t =[ ( 1− α)ζa∗ + µ∗π]At (9)
which grows at the same rate g as the technology frontier At,a sc l a i m e d .
2.6 Credit constraints
Now suppose that credit markets are imperfect. Each innovator is a young person with
access to the wage income wt. Thus to invest Nt in an R&D project she must borrow
L = Nt − wt. Following Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) suppose that at a cost cNt
the innovator can hide the result of a successful innovation and thereby avoid repaying her
creditors, where 0 <c<1. This cost as an indicator of the degree of creditor protection.
In countries where laws and institutions make fraud a costly option creditors are better
protected and therefore, as we shall see, credit is more readily available to entrepreneurs.
The innovator must pay the hiding cost at the beginning of the period, when she decides
whether or not to be dishonest. She will do so when it is in her self interest, namely when
the following incentive-compatibility constraint is violated:




R(Nt − wt) (10)
7where R is the interest factor on the loan and e µ is the production function for innovations,
i.e. the non-negative inverse of the function13 e n:
e µ(n)=
³p
η2 +2 δn− η
´
/δ. (11)
The right hand side of (10) is the expected saving from deciding to be dishonest when
investing at the rate Nt.
The only potential lenders in this OLG model are other young people,14 who will lend
only if oﬀered an expected rate of return equal to r. Thus the interest factor on the loan













This limit will be binding if the unconstrained optimal investment n∗At+1 violates it.
Substituting for the equilibrium wage using equation (5) we see that the credit limit will
be binding at date t if the country falls too far behind the technology frontier; that is, if its
technology gap satisﬁes the inequality:
at <n ∗/ω (c) ≡ a(c) (13)
where:
ω(c) ≡
(1 + r)(1− α)ζ
(1 + r − c)(1+g)
. (14)
Intuitively, entrepreneurs in a country that has fallen too far behind the frontier can no
longer ﬁnance the investments needed to optimally invest in frontier technology.15
The function ω(c) is a (productivity-adjusted) “ﬁnance multiplier” which depends pos-
i t i v e l yo nt h ec o s tc of defrauding a creditor. Therefore a(c) is a decreasing function of c.
That is, in countries with a high degree of creditor protection the critical gap value a below
which entrepreneurs become credit-constrained is lower than in countries with a low degree
of creditor protection.
When (13) holds, each entrepreneur will spend the maximum possible on technology





13Note that e µ(0) = 0, e µ
0 (n) > 0 and e µ
00 (n) < 0.
14If we assume that the discount factor β is the same in all countries then lenders can come from any
country. Credit market imperfections in this model do not imply international capital immobility because
the risk of default is assumed to be independent of the lender’s nationality.
15This raises the question of why a constrained entrepreneur at t − 1 would not instead target a lower
technology level Bt < At, which would be less expensive given the assumption that the cost of innovating
at a given rate is proportional to the targeted technology level. In Appendix B we answer the question by
showing that this alternative would be dominated, from the entrepreneur’s point of view, by the strategy of
always targeting the frontier.
8resulting in the subsequent innovation rate µt+1 = e µ(ω(c)at).T h e r e f o r e at+1 will be
determined according to:
at+1 = e µ(ω(c)at)+
(1 − e µ(ω(c)at))
1+g
at ≡ F2 (at) (15)
for as long as (13) holds.
2.7 The world growth rate
As in other Schumpeterian models, we suppose that the growth rate g of the global tech-
nology frontier is determined by the pace of innovations in the leading countries, none of
which are assumed to be credit constrained. For simplicity, assume there is just one leader,
labeled country 1. Then:
g = σµ∗ = σ
β1π1 − η1
δ1
where σ>0 is a spillover coeﬃcient and the subscript 1 indicates a parameter value in
country 1.
3 Theoretical predictions
3.1 Three dynamic patterns
In general, the country’s technology gap at will evolve according to the unconstrained
dynamical system (8) when at ≥ a(c) and according to the constrained system (15) when
at <a(c). Thus:
at+1 = F (at) ≡ min{F1 (at),F 2 (at)}. (16)
Note that F1 is a linear function with positive vertical intercept and a slope between 0 and










We interpret countries where the cost c of defrauding a creditor is higher as countries
with more highly developed ﬁnancial systems, because among the services performed by
well functioning ﬁnancial intermediaries and markets are the detection and prevention of
fraud. Then countries will fall into three groups, deﬁned by the value of their ﬁnance
multiplier ω(c), which is an increasing function of our indicator c of ﬁnancial development.
The evolution of the technology gap is illustrated for each case in Figures 1 ∼ 3b e l o w .




then (since a∗ ≥ a(c)) F (a∗)=F1 (a∗). A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 ,at will converge
asymptotically to the unconstrained steady state a∗ > 0. Per-capita income will be
16S e ef o o t n o t e1 3a b o v e .
9given by equation (9) in the long run, which implies that the country will grow at the
same rate g as the global technology frontier in the long run. Increases in ﬁnancial
development will have no marginal eﬀect on either the steady-state growth rate or the
steady-state technology gap; these converge respectively to the values g and a∗ which
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Figure 1: A country with the highest level of ﬁnancial development







then F (a∗) <F 1 (a∗), so at cannot converge to the unconstrained steady state a∗.














Therefore, as shown in Figure 2, at will converge to a limit b a that is strictly positive
(except in the borderline case where
ηg
1+g = ω(c) and b a =0 )b u tl e s st h a na∗. In the
long run per, capita income will be:


























10This country will also grow at the rate g in the long run, because b Yt is strictly propor-
tional to At, as is Y ∗
t . Increases in ﬁnancial development will have no marginal eﬀect
on the steady-state growth rate but they will have a positive marginal eﬀect on the
steady-state technology gap b a, because they shift the curve F2 (at) up in Figure 2.18
A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 8 )i n c r e a s e si nﬁnancial development will also have a positive eﬀect on
the country’s steady-state per-capita GDP because of both the direct eﬀect on e µ and
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Figure 2: A medium level of ﬁnancial development





then F (a∗) <F 1 (a∗) and F0 (0) < 1, so at will converge to zero, as shown in Figure
3. The following argument shows that in this case the rate of productivity growth,
deﬁned as Gt =( At+1/At)−1, will approach a limiting value that is strictly between















Gt =( 1+g)l i m
t→∞
















11It can also be shown that in this case productivity and per-capita GDP have the same
long-run growth rate.19 Thus the steady-state growth rate of per-capita GDP will
be strictly less than the frontier growth rate g and will be strictly increasing in the




1 + t a
() t a F 1
* a 0 
( ) t a F2
0 a
Figure 3: The lowest level of ﬁnancial development
3.2 Summary
In summary, three central implications of our theory are that:
1. the likelihood that a country will converge to the frontier growth rate increases with
its level of ﬁnancial development,
19The long-run growth rates of productivity and per-capita GDP will be the same if Yt/At converges to a
positive constant as t →∞ . By (6) above:
Yt
At


















































122. in a country that converges to the frontier growth rate, ﬁnancial development has a
positive but eventually vanishing eﬀect on the steady-state level of per-capita GDP
relative to the frontier, and
3. the steady-state growth rate of a country that fails to converge to the frontier growth
rate increases with its level of ﬁnancial development.
Actually, the above model implies a somewhat stronger version of 1 ∼ 3, namely that:
4. the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on steady-state growth should be positive up to
some critical level Fg and zero thereafter, and the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on
the steady-state level of per-capita GDP should be positive up to some critical level
Fy and zero thereafter, with Fg <F y.
The diﬀerence between 4 and the combination of 1 ∼ 3 is that 4 implies a zero eﬀect
on steady-state levels beyond some threshold, and that this threshold is greater than the
growth threshold Fg.
In the next section we will confront these predictions with cross-country evidence on
ﬁnancial development and growth. Although the purpose of this exercise is certainly not
to perform a structural estimation of our stylized model, in Appendix C we show that the
empirical convergence equation (23) that we estimate below can be regarded as a smooth
approximation to the theoretical diﬀerence equation (16) implied by the model.
3.3 Empirical measures of ﬁnancial intermediation
We do not have a direct empirical measure of the exogenous cost c of defrauding a creditor,
which our theoretical analysis takes as an indicator of ﬁnancial development. The empirical
literature on ﬁnance and growth has used some measure of ﬁnancial intermediary balance
sheets relative to GDP as the indicator of ﬁnancial development. This makes sense in the
context of our model if we assume that all lending to entrepreneurs takes place through
ﬁnancial intermediaries and that all loans are paid (or written oﬀ)a f t e ro n ep e r i o d .




where N is R&D expenditure, so that N − w is the amount of R&D expenditure that is















which is an increasing function of our theoretical measure c of ﬁnancial development.
13In countries where credit constraints are not binding, the theory implies that in steady
state the F ratio will be unrelated to our theoretical measure:
F =
n∗ − (1 − α)ζa∗
(1 − α)ζa∗ + µ∗π
.
This makes F endogenous to the growth process because variables such as a∗ and π have
eﬀects on both F and the level (or growth rate) of per-capita GDP. Therefore in our em-
p i r i c a lw o r kw ew i l lw a n tt oﬁnd instruments for F, preferably instruments whose primary
impact on the growth process works through the laws and institutions that determine the
extent of creditor rights in a country, and which are therefore closely related to the the-
oretical variable c. Our theory implies that implications 1 ∼ 4a b o v es h o u l dh o l dw h e n
changes in ﬁnancial development are measured by exogenous changes in F attributable to
such instruments.
4 Credit and convergence: Evidence
In this section we confront our theoretical predictions with evidence. After describing our
d a t a ,w ee s t i m a t es o m es p l i t - s a m p l er e g r e ssions as an introductory test for the coeﬃcient
changes that are expected across sub-samples. Then we carry out an interaction analysis
aimed at testing implications 1 and 2 above. This interaction analysis provides strong
evidence for our model and for the general proposition that a country’s rate of convergence
to the frontier growth rate depends on its level of ﬁnancial development.
4.1 Data
In our empirical analysis we use cross-sectional data20 on 71 countries over the period 1960-
1995, taken from Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), who found a strongly positive and robust
eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation on short-run growth in a regression with initial GDP on
the right hand side. We use private credit as our measure of ﬁnancial intermediation. This
is the value of credits by ﬁnancial intermediaries to the private sector, divided by GDP. It
is the preferred measure of Levine, Loayza and Beck because it excludes credit granted to
the public sector and credit granted by the central bank and development banks. We also
report results below using alternative measures of ﬁnancial intermediation.
Figures 4 and 5 show that the raw data are roughly consistent with the strong implication
4 stated in section 3.2. In Figure 4 the average growth rate of per-capita GDP for each
country is plotted against the average level of ﬁnancial intermediation. If we take out
the outliers with the ﬁve highest growth rates, which are clearly countries with growth
rates above their steady-state values, the scatter diagram appears consistent with a positive
eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation on growth which vanishes once ﬁnancial intermediation
has reached a critical value Fg approximately equal to the value achieved by Greece (39%),
as predicted by the ﬁrst part of implication 4. Figure 5 on the other hand plots the average
log of per-capita GDP on the vertical axis. It appears consistent with a positive eﬀect of
ﬁnancial intermediation on the level of GDP which vanishes once ﬁnancial intermediation
20See Appendix D for description and sources of data.
14has reached a critical value Fy approximately equal to the value achieved by Canada (61%),
as predicted by the second part of implication 4. Moreover, according to these rough









































































Figure 4: Financial intermediation and long-run growth of per-capita GDP
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Figure 5: Financial intermediation and long-run average per-capita GDP
These ﬁgures do not control for the eﬀects of initial GDP or any other possible inﬂu-
ences on growth. Nor do they deal with the problem of possible endogeneity of ﬁnancial
intermediation. For these we turn to the following regression results.
154.2 Split-sample regressions
A simple way to test implications 1 ∼ 3 above is to split the sample into diﬀerent groups
a c c o r d i n gt ot h e i rl e v e lo fﬁnancial intermediation and then to estimate the cross-country
growth equation:
gi − g1 = β0 + βfFi + βy · (yi − y1)+εi (19)
within each group of countries. In (19), gi is the average growth rate of country i’s per-
capita GDP over the 1960-95 period, g1 is the frontier (US) growth rate (also of per-capita
GDP) over that period, Fi is the country’s average level of ﬁnancial intermediation, yi is the
log of per-capita GDP in the country at the start of the period, y1 is the log of per-capita
GDP in the United States at the start of the period, β0,β f and βy are constant coeﬃcients
and εi a classical disturbance term.
The growth equation (19) is standard except for the presence of the U.S. variables g1 and
y1. Since these variables are the same for all countries they just aﬀect the constant term in
a cross-section growth regression. We include them anyway to emphasize that the equation
can be regarded as a diﬀerence equation in the “relative output" variable b yi (t) deﬁned as
the log of per-capita GDP relative to the United States. That is, by deﬁnition the average
growth rate diﬀerential gi − g1 equals the average change in b yi (t) from the beginning of
the sample period until the beginning of the next 35-year period, divided by 0.35. So (19)
relates the change in relative output to the level of relative output. There are two separate
cases to consider:
1. Suppose βy 6=0 . Then we can express (19) as the diﬀerence equation:
∆yi (t)=λ · (b yi (t) − b y ∗
i ) (20)
with the initial condition:
b yi (0) = yi − y1
where ∆ is the forward diﬀerence operator, b y∗
i is the steady-state relative output:
b y ∗
i = −




λ =( 0 .35) · βy.
So in this case the coeﬃcient βy is a convergence parameter determining whether or
not, and if so how fast, the country’s relative output converges to its steady-state
value. More importantly for our purposes, βy also determines whether or not the
country’s growth rate converges to that of the United States, because (20) makes
the growth rate diﬀerential proportional to relative output and thus implies that the
growth rate diﬀerential will converge to zero if and only if relative output converges. A
necessary condition for convergence is that βy < 0.I fβy > 0 then a country starting
below its steady-state relative output would fall increasingly behind over time, with
a growth rate that falls increasingly below that of the United States.
162. Suppose βy =0 . In this case, there is no well-deﬁned steady-state relative output to
act as a gravitational force. Instead, a country’s growth rate would always equal the
steady-stage value:
g∗
i = g1 + β0 + βfFi + εi (22)
with no tendency to gravitate towards the frontier rate g1. If g∗
i <g 1 then the country’s
relative output would fall continually at the rate g1−g∗
i with no tendency to stabilize.
Our theory implies that the estimated coeﬃcients βy and βf in the growth equation (19)
should vary across sub-samples grouped according to ﬁnancial intermediation. Speciﬁcally,
according to implications 1 and 3, countries where ﬁnancial intermediation is low enough
should have steady-state growth rates diﬀerent from the frontier rate g1, which is only
possible in case 2 above where the convergence parameter βy equals zero. (In case 1 the
growth rate either converges to g1 or it does not converge to any limiting value at all.) For
such countries implication 3 states that the long-run growth rate should be an increasing
function of ﬁnancial intermediation, which according to (22) implies that the coeﬃcient βf
should be positive. Thus we should ﬁnd that among countries with the lowest levels of
ﬁnancial intermediation, βy =0and βf > 0.
Likewise the theory implies that countries where ﬁnancial intermediation is high enough
should have growth rates that converge to the frontier rate g1, which is only possible if the
convergence parameter βy is negative. For such countries implication 2 above states that
steady-state relative output should be independent of the level of ﬁnancial intermediation,
which according to equation (21) can only happen if the coeﬃcient βf equals zero. Thus we
should ﬁnd that among countries with the highest levels of ﬁnancial intermediation, βy < 0
and βf =0 .
More generally the theory suggests that the higher the average level of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation in a group of countries the more negative the estimated βy should be and the
less positive the estimated βf should be.
Table 1 below shows the results of estimating the equation using OLS with two groups
- - the top and bottom halves with respect to the average level of private credit.21 Within
the bottom half the convergence parameter βy is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and
the coeﬃcient βf of private credit is signiﬁcantly positive, whereas within the top half the
convergence parameter is negative with a high t-statistic and the coeﬃcient of private credit
is substantially lower than within the bottom half.
TABLE 1 HERE
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the same equation using three groups - - the top,
middle and bottom thirds with respect to private credit. Again the convergence parameter
βy decreases and the coeﬃcient βf of private credit decreases as we move up the groups.
In the top third the convergence parameter is signiﬁcantly negative and the coeﬃcient of
private credit is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In the bottom third the convergence
21The dependent variable in the regressions reported in our empirical results is gi whereas the LHS of (19)
and (23) below is gi − g1. This discrepancy clearly aﬀects nothing but the constant terms whose values we
are not concerned with.
17parameter is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and the coeﬃcient βf of private credit is
signiﬁcantly positive.22
TABLE 2 HERE
The split-sample regressions thus bear out all of the predictions that we derived from
implications 1 ∼ 3o ft h et h e o r y . 23
4.3 Interaction analysis
As an alternative to these split-sample regressions, which quickly run into serious small-
sample problems as we divide the sample into more and more groups, we perform most of
our tests using the following interaction analysis. Consider the growth regression:24
gi − g1 = β0 + βfFi + βy · (yi − y1)+βfy · Fi · (yi − y1)+βxXi + εi (23)
in which the symbols have the same meaning as before and Xi is a set of other regressors.
This is a standard growth regression except that this time we have included not only the
U.S. variables g1 and y1 but also the interaction variable Fi · (yi − y1).
As before, this regression can be expressed as a diﬀerence equation in a country’s relative
output b yi. Under the assumption that βy + βfyFi 6=0we can write (23) as:
∆yi (t)=λi · (b yi (t) − b y ∗
i ) (24)
with the initial condition:
b yi (0) = yi − y1




β0 + βfFi + βxXi + εi
βy + βfyFi
(25)
and now each country has its own parameter:




that varies according to its level of ﬁnancial intermediation.
22Rioja and Valev (2003) estimated a similar split sample regression using the same data, and came
to apparently conﬂicting results. They split the sample according to per-capita GDP and found that the
coeﬃcient of private credit was signiﬁcantly greater for the top two thirds than the bottom third. The conﬂict
with our results seems to arise mainly from the fact that instead of estimating three separate regressions
Rioja and Valev estimated a common regression with slope dummies only on private credit. If we do the
same we ﬁnd the middle third has the largest coeﬃcient of private credit. However, our theory implies that
there should be diﬀerent coeﬃcients for all regressors, not just for private credit, and this implication is
borne out by the results of Tables 1 and 2.
23We obtained similar results when instead of using initial relative output we used the productivity gaps
described in section 4.3.3 below.
24See Appendix C, where we show that equation (23) can be regarded as an approximation to a smooth
extension of our theoretical model.
18According to (23) a country will converge to the frontier growth rate only if its conver-
gence parameter:
βy + βfyFi (26)
is negative. Thus the likelihood of convergence will increase with ﬁnancial development
(implication 1 above) if and only if:
βfy < 0. (27)
Since this implication constitutes the central proposition of our theoretical model, our main
objective in estimating (23) will be to see whether or not the estimated interaction coeﬃcient
is indeed signiﬁcantly negative.












Assume that all countries lag the United States in steady state: b y ∗
i ≤ 0. Then according to
(23), ﬁnancial development will have a positive overall eﬀect on the steady-state per-capita
GDP of every country that converges only if (27) holds and also the direct eﬀect βf of
ﬁnancial development is non-negative. For only then will the numerator of (28) be non-
negative for all converging countries. (The denominator is positive for all such countries.)
Moreover, the overall eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on steady-state relative output will
vanish for at least one country (the leader) only if the direct eﬀect is equal to zero:
βf =0 . (29)
Our main concern in the paper is that βfy < 0, which is what implication 1, the eﬀect
of ﬁnance on convergence, rests on. If we were to ﬁnd in addition that βf =0this would
add empirical support to the particular mechanism analyzed in the previous sections, by
corroborating implication 2. If we were to ﬁnd that βf > 0 this would imply that the
overall eﬀect (28) of ﬁnancial development on the level of GDP never vanishes, even for
the leader, whereas if we were to ﬁnd βf < 0 this would imply that the overall eﬀect (28)
becomes negative for countries close to the leader. Only when βf =0is the overall eﬀect
(28) non-negative for all converging countries and zero for some, in accordance with with
implication 2.25
4 . 3 . 1 M a i nr e g r e s s i o nr e s u l t s
The ﬁnancial intermediation variable F in equation (23) may be endogenous because of
feedback from growth to ﬁnance, or because of the common eﬀects of omitted variables
on both growth and ﬁnance. Moreover, if we maintain the exogeneity of initial relative
output then endogeneity of F is likely to entail the endogeneity of the interaction variable
F · (y − y1). To deal with this problem we estimated (23) using instrumental variables,26
25Note that equation (23) does not yield a determinate long-run growth rate for countries that fail to
converge, so it is silent on implication 3 above.
26We also performed all of the regressions below using the GMM estimator that Davidson and MacKinnon
(1993, p.599) call H2SLS, implemented in Stata by the ivgmm0 routine, which allows for heteroskedasticity
19instrumenting for F and F ·(y − y1) using legal origins (L) and legal origins interacted with
initial relative output (L · (y − y1)).
Legal origins is a set of three zero-one variables, used ﬁrst in the economics literature
by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and further extended to all 71 countries by Levine, Loayza
and Beck (2000), indicating whether the country’s legal system is based on French, English
or German traditions (the omitted case is Scandinavian). La Porta et al. make the case
that the main eﬀect of L is on the rights of investors and creditors. Thus Levine, Loayza
a n dB e c ka r g u et h a tL constitutes a valid set of instruments for ﬁnancial intermediation in
a growth regression, because it is clearly exogenous and its main eﬀects on growth should
work through ﬁnancial development. The same argument suggests that the main eﬀect of
L should work through an eﬀect much like that of the variable c in our theory representing
the cost of defrauding creditors.
We also used the interacted variables L · (y − y1) a si n s t r u m e n t ss oa st om o d e lt h e
interaction term F · (y − y1). Under the maintained hypothesis that y − y1 is exogenous,
the validity of L as instruments implies the validity of L · (y − y1). Table 3 below shows
that these instruments account for a signiﬁcant amount of variation in F and F · (y − y1).
When initial relative output is omitted from the ﬁrst-stage regression the adjusted R2 is
0.56 in the ﬁrst-stage regression for F and 0.40 in the regression for F · (y − y1).W h e n
initial relative output is included as a regressor the individual coeﬃcients on the external
instruments loose signiﬁcance but together they remain highly signiﬁcant, as indicated by
the F-tests of the hypothesis that all excluded instruments have zero coeﬃcients in the two
ﬁrst-stage regressions.
TABLE 3 HERE
The results of Table 3 suggest that German legal origins provide the strongest protection
of creditor rights and French the weakest, at least for countries close enough to the frontier
that the interaction terms L·(y − y1) are all negligible. For such a country column 1 of Table
3 indicates that having German legal origins instead of Scandinavian raises private credit by
53 percentage points, whereas having French legal origins instead of Scandinavian reduces
private credit by 6 percentage points. Column 2 indicates that, again for countries close
enough to the frontier, having German legal origins instead of Scandinavian raises private
credit by 16 percentage points while having French legal origins rather that Scandinavian
reduces private credit by 43 percentage points. In both cases the estimates imply that having
German rather than French legal origins raises private credit by 59 percentage points for
countries very close to the frontier. As the t-statistics reported in Table 1 make clear the
prediction that private credit will be higher under the German system than any other can
be made with a high degree of conﬁdence, while the prediction that it will be lower under
the French system cannot.27
of an unknown kind. The results were not materially diﬀerent from those generated by the IV estimator,
which is equivalent to GMM under the assumption of homoskedasticity, except for some diﬀerences noted
in footnote 33 below.
27These results accord partly with the ﬁndings by La Porta et al. (1997). In their Table 2, they use an
index from 1 to 4 to measure the degree of creditor protection in diﬀerent countries. They ﬁnd an average of
20Table 3 also conﬁrms that private credit will be largest under German legal origins for
almost all countries, even those very far from the frontier. Thus the estimates in column 1
make private credit largest under the German system as long as initial relative output lies
in the interval from -2.523 to zero, an interval that includes all but 8 of the 71 countries.
Below that interval they make private credit largest under the Scandinavian system. The
estimates in column 2 make private credit largest under the German system for all countries
within the observed range of initial relative outputs. The results do not however uniformly
predict that private credit will be lowest under the French system for countries far from
the frontier. For while the estimates of column 1 make that prediction for all countries
within the observed range of initial relative outputs, the estimates of column 2 predict that
private credit will be lowest under Scandinavian rather than French legal origins once initial
relative output has fallen below 0.392, which includes all but 7 countries.
The results of the IV estimation are presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 4 below. They
show that ﬁnancial intermediation interacted with initial relative output has a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect (βfy = −0.06 < 0), bearing out the main implication of the theory to
the eﬀect that convergence depends positively on ﬁnancial development. They also show
that the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation is approximately zero, thus bearing out
implication 2 above. According to these results the direct eﬀect βy of initial relative output
on subsequent growth is positive, which introduces a possible element of non-convergence
for some countries. Recall however that the overall convergence parameter is βy + βfyF,
which must be negative for a country to converge. Thus a country can converge as long as




which according to these estimates equals 25 percent. As we explain in more detail in
section 4.3.2 below, half the countries in our sample have private credit above this critical
value.
TABLE 4 HERE
The next three columns of Table 4 show what happens when three alternative measures
of ﬁnancial intermediation are used. The ﬁrst is liquid liabilities, which is currency plus
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries, di-
vided by GDP. This is a commonly used measure of ﬁnancial intermediation, although it
includes liabilities backed by credits to the public sector and may involve double counting.
The second alternative measure is bank assets, the value of all credits by banks (but not
other ﬁnancial intermediaries). The third is commercial-central bank, the ratio of commer-
cial bank assets to the sum of commercial plus central bank assets, which has been used
3.11 in English Origin countries, 1.58 in French Origin countries, 2.33 in German Origin countries and 2.00
in Scandinavian Origin countries. But this does not control for GDP per capita. In the following Table 3,
they ﬁnd however that the relationship between creditor rights and indebtedness is more tenuous than that
between investor protection and equity ﬁnancing.
21by others although it is not so much a measure of ﬁnancial depth as a measure of what
fraction of credit is issued by private intermediaries. Our main results (βfy < 0 and βf =0 )
are robust to all three alternative measures, although in the case of commercial-central
bank (our least preferred measure ex ante)t h ec o e ﬃcient estimates all lose their statistical
signiﬁcance.
The instruments L and L·(y − y1) are good predictors of the endogenous variables F and
F ·(y − y1) in all cases except where F is deﬁned by commercial-central bank, as indicated
by the p-values of the F-test from the ﬁrst-stage regressions. To be valid instruments L
and L · (y − y1) must also be unaﬀected by feedback from the growth process, and they
must not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on growth working through some other variable that has
been excluded from the second-stage regression. Since legal origins were determined long
before the 1960-95 period over which we are measuring growth we do not have to worry
about feedback from the growth process. Also, as indicated above there are strong a priori
reasons for believing that their main eﬀects on growth work through ﬁnancial development.
Thus we have good reason for thinking that our instruments are not only strong but valid.
We subjected this ap r i o r ireasoning to a standard statistical test. Formally, a set of
instruments is valid it they are all uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the growth
regression. This is the null hypothesis of the Sargan test, whose p-value is reported in
Table 4.28 If the instruments are valid this statistic has a χ2 distribution with 4 degrees of
freedom, since there are 6 excluded instruments (L and L·(y − y1)) but only 2 endogenous
variables (F and F ·(y − y1)). In no case does the test reject the validity of the instruments
at conventional signiﬁcance levels.
As a further check we also redid the estimation using as instruments the initial (1960)
value F0 of ﬁnancial intermediation and F0·(y − y1), instead of L and L·(y − y1). The results
are presented in the next four columns of Table 4. The coeﬃcients remained close to zero on
ﬁnancial intermediation and signiﬁcantly negative on the interaction variable F · (y − y1),
except again when ﬁnancial intermediation was measured by commercial-central bank, in
which case all coeﬃcients became insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
As expected, F0 and F0 · (y − y1) are good predictors of F and F · (y − y1); this is
indicated by the low p-values of the ﬁrst-stage F-tests. There is also little reason for believing
that the main eﬀects of these instruments on growth work through channels other than
ﬁnancial development. However, they may be aﬀected by feedback from the growth process,
in the sense that countries in which growth has been strong in the sample period may also
have had strong growth at the beginning of the period, so that they are likely to have high
values of F0 for the same reason that they are likely to have high values of F. Because of this,
and also because we cannot apply the Sargan test for the validity of these instruments,29
we choose to work from here on with our legal origins instruments.
On the other hand, a Wu-Hausman test of the exogeneity of F and F · (y − y1) in the
growth equation was inconclusive, with a p-value of 0.18, suggesting that perhaps we could
have used OLS consistently. The last four columns of Table 4 show that similar results follow
using OLS on all four measures of ﬁnancial intermediation, adding further corroboration to
28The Sargan test statistic is the uncentered R
2 from regressing the IV residuals on the excluded instru-
ments.
29The Sargan test is not applicable in these regressions because there are only as many excluded instru-
ments (2) as endogenous variables, and hence the IV residuals are identically orthogonal to the instruments.
22implications 1 and 2 of our theoretical model.
We checked the robustness of our results by reestimating our basic equation (23), with F
deﬁned as private credit and without any X variables, omitting all countries with a residual
more than 3 times the standard error of the equation in the original IV estimation (just one
country), then omitting all with a residual more than 2 times (4 countries) and then all with
a residual more than 1 time (17 countries). The crucial coeﬃcient βfy did not change sign
and its statistical signiﬁcance increased at each step, while βf remained not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
We also checked for robustness against other regressors by reestimating the equation
using the same alternative conditioning sets X as used by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000).
The basic conditioning set includes just average years of schooling in 1960. The policy con-
ditioning set includes the basic conditioning set plus measures of government size, inﬂation,
the black market exchange-rate premium and openness to trade. The full conditioning set
includes the policy conditioning set plus measures of political stability and ethnic diversity.
The results of this robustness check are presented in Table 5 below.
TABLE 5 HERE
As this table indicates, the sign, size and signiﬁcance of the crucial coeﬃcients βf and
βfy remain virtually unchanged across alternative conditioning sets, in the case of all 3
deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial intermediation. (We have dropped commercial-central bank partly
because of our a priori doubts about its suitability and also because we already know from
Table 4 above that it does not behave as predicted by the theory.) Moreover, as indicated
by the Sargan test results, the instruments L and L · (y − y1) continue always to pass the
standard test of being uncorrelated with the residuals of the growth equation.
4.3.2 Which countries converge?
The fact that the estimated direct eﬀect βy of initial relative output (y − y1) is positive
implies that according to these results countries with extremely low ﬁnancial intermediation
will fail to join the convergence club, since the overall eﬀect of y − y1 on growth (the
“convergence parameter”) equals βy+βfyF, which is positive when F is close enough to zero.
Figure 6 below shows our estimates (from the ﬁrst column of Table 4) of this convergence
parameter as a function of private credit, over the observed range of F, with 2-standard
deviation bands. According to these estimates 36 of the 71 countries have a negative
convergence parameter and 35 have a positive one. In this sense, the estimated value of the
crucial interaction parameter βfy is not only statistically signiﬁcant but also quantitatively
large enough to account for diﬀerent convergence experiences across countries in the sample.































Figure 6: Estimated convergence parameter over the observed rate of private credit.
Positive values imply nonconvergence.
Table 6 classiﬁes countries into three convergence groups, according to whether their
convergence parameter is at least 2 standard deviations above or below zero. There are 30
countries in the group most likely to converge, including all the OECD countries except
Belgium, whose estimated parameter was the smallest of all the positive ones. There are 7
countries in the group most likely to diverge, all them extremely poor, leaving 34 countries
in the middle with a convergence parameter within 2 standard deviations of zero. The
estimated value of this convergence parameter for a country with F equal to the average
value of private credit across all countries is −0.82, which by the usual calculation implies
a convergence rate of almost 5% per year.
TABLE 6 HERE
4.3.3 Productivity
As a further test of our theory we examined whether the eﬀects of F and F ·(y − y1) on per-
capita GDP growth were working through productivity growth, as implied by the theory,
instead of working just through capital accumulation. So we re-estimated the basic growth
equation (23) using productivity growth as the dependent variable instead of growth in
per-capita GDP, and interpreting y as the log of aggregate productivity in 1960 instead of
t h el o go fp e r - c a p i t aG D P .T h er e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e7b e l o wf o rt h ec a s ew h e r e
ﬁnancial intermediation is measured by our preferred variable, private credit.30
TABLE 7 HERE
30Estimates using liquid liabilities and bank assets yield the same conclusions.
24In the ﬁrst four rows our productivity measure is multi-factor productivity, taken from
Benhabib and Spiegel (2002), which covers almost all the same countries for the same 1960-
1995 period. This measure does not consider schooling as an input. As constructed by
Benhabib and Spiegel it equals GDP per person, divided by capital per person to the power
1/3. This would be a measure of Hicks-neutral productivity if the aggregate production
function were Cobb-Douglas with a capital coeﬃcient of 1/3 and per-capita labor input
were constant. In order to make our results comparable to those using per-capita GDP
we multiplied the log of this original productivity measure by 1.5 to make it a measure
of Harrod-neutral (labor-augmenting) productivity, whose steady-state growth rate should
equal the steady-state growth rate of per-capita GDP.
A c c o r d i n gt oT a b l e7t h ec r u c i a lc o e ﬃcient βfa of F · (lna − lna1) is between 85 and
95 percent of the analogous estimates of the interaction coeﬃcient reported in the previous
Table 5, and it remains statistically signiﬁcant. Also the coeﬃcient βf of F remains not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As before, the results are stable across conditioning sets
and the legal origins instruments L and L·(lna − lna1) p a s st h eS a r g a nt e s ta tc o n v e n t i o n a l
signiﬁcance levels.
The next four rows of Table 7 repeat the same exercise using a measure of total factor
productivity that takes education into account, under the assumption of a constant 7%
rate of return to a year of schooling, using a macro-Mincer approach. The coeﬃcients are
almost the same size and have almost the same statistical signiﬁcance as before, although
the Sargan test for the validity of our legal-origins instruments is now inconclusive.
The similarity of these results to those using per-capita GDP are what we would expect
from the theory developed above. The fact that the coeﬃcients are somewhat smaller than
when per-capita GDP is used may simply reﬂect the fact that productivity is not as well
measured as GDP in cross country data, because of large measurement errors in investment
data (Pritchett, 2000) underlying the regressors lna − lna1 and F · (lna − lna1) in the
productivity-growth equation. The possibility of such measurement errors is the main
reason we prefer to use per-capita GDP rather than productivity in our main empirical
work, another reason being that we can work with a larger sample (71 countries rather than
65 or 66).
4.3.4 Alternative explanations of divergence
Perhaps what prevents poor countries from converging in growth rate is not lack of ﬁnancial
development but lack of education, as implied by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) or
Benhabib and Spiegel (2002), or perhaps ﬁnancial development matters for growth only
because it facilitates investment in schooling, as in Galor and Zeira (1993). Or maybe
divergence is explained by some other variable that is associated with a low initial level
of income.31 Table 8 begins to address these questions by checking whether the eﬀect of
ﬁnance on convergence is robust to including a possible eﬀect of schooling or of initial
relative output on convergence.
31Another interpretation of our ﬁnding of a negative interaction coeﬃcient βfy is that entrepreneurs in
poor countries have relatively few alternatives to borrowing from ﬁnancial intermediaries because of weak or
non-existent equity and bond markets. To the extent that weak equity and bond markets are a by-product
of weak investor protection, the same factor that our theory is focusing on, this alternative interpretation is
complementary with ours.
25First we included as an additional regressor the square of initial relative output, (y − y1)
2.
If this term were to have a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient βyy it might indicate that what
keeps poor countries from joining the convergence club is just being poor to start with, or
something other than ﬁnance that is correlated with being poor to start with. For in that
case the overall eﬀect of initial relative output on growth would be βy+βfyF+2βyy·(y − y1),
which would be positive when both F and y are small enough. As shown in the second
column of Table 8, this eﬀect was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Comparison with the
ﬁrst column shows that the inclusion of the quadratic term also did not materially aﬀect
the estimated values or signiﬁcance levels of the crucial parameters βf and βfy.N o r d i d
it aﬀect the validity of the instruments L and L · (y − y1) according to the p-value of the
Sargan test.
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Next we included as additional regressors not (y − y1)
2 but the Schooling variable
School60 - average years of schooling in 1960 - and also the interaction term School60 ·
(y − y1). If this interaction term were to have a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient βsy it might
indicate that lack of education is what keeps poor countries from joining the convergence
club, since the overall eﬀect of initial relative output on growth would be βy +βfyF +βsy ·
School60, which would be positive when both F and School60 are small enough. As shown
in the third column, the estimated βsy is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and the esti-
mated values and signiﬁcance levels of the crucial parameters βf and βfy were not materially
aﬀected by the inclusion of this additional interaction term. The next column shows that
the same results hold when we use as our education variable average years of secondary
schooling instead of School60. Again the direct and interaction terms are insigniﬁcant and
the crucial parameters βf and βfy retained their sign and signiﬁcance. The next column of
Table 8 show that the same is true when we use as our schooling variable hy, the ratio of
human capital to GDP in 1985, as measured by Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997). The
ﬁnal two columns show that the same is true when we use the growth in average years of
schooling from 1960 to 1995 and the growth in the Klenow/Rodríguez-Clare human-capital
ratio from 1960 to 1985.
The results of Table 8 show once more the robustness of ﬁnancial intermediation as a
source of (non)convergence and provide further support for our theoretical model. They also
provide further evidence of the validity of our legal origins instruments L and L · (y − y1),
in two diﬀerent ways. First, as shown by the reported p-values, the instruments continue
to pass the Sargan test even in the presence of these alternative regressors. Second and
more fundamentally, the results address the main question that might be raised concerning
the instruments, namely whether their eﬀe c t so ng r o w t hm i g h tb ew o r k i n gt h r o u g hs o m e
channel other than ﬁnance, despite our a priori reasons for thinking otherwise and despite
the results of the Sargan test, which might not be powerful against plausible alternatives.
For example, Acemoglu (2003) has argued that the main eﬀects of legal origins is to foster
institutions that promote growth by protecting citizens from the power of the state. Perhaps
it is the correlation between our instruments L and L · (y − y1) on the one hand and these
alternative channels of inﬂuence on the other that is producing our estimated eﬀects of F
26and F · (y − y1). The results of Table 8 show that if this is true then that other channel is
not likely to be schooling or human capital, for if it was then the direct inclusion of these
variables in the growth regression should soak up the explanatory power of the ﬁtted values
of F and F · (y − y1), which clearly they do not.
It should be mentioned however that the results of Table 8 do not imply, even if taken
at face value, that schooling is unimportant in the growth process. Instead they imply that
if schooling matters then it does so in a way that works through ﬁnancial development. For
example, a better educated population may lower the costs of innovation,32 thus making
the credit constraint less binding. Additionally a better educated population with higher
incomes would supply more loanable funds, provide more creditworthy borrowers and thus
encourage investments in ﬁnancial intermediation that also generate growth. Indeed this is
suggested by the ﬁrst-stage regressions of the IV estimations underlying Table 8, in which
schooling is often a signiﬁcant determinant of ﬁnancial development.
T a b l e9b e l o ws h o w st h er e s u l t so fp e r f o r m i n gt h es a m ee x e r c i s eu s i n gal a r g en u m -
ber of alternative variables along with their interaction with initial relative output. The
ﬁrst group of variables consists of geographic measures - - an African dummy, distance to
the equator, the fraction of population within 100 miles of an ocean-navigable waterway,
and the fraction of population in the tropics - - which according to one school of thought
should have signiﬁcant long-term eﬀect on growth and/or the level of per-capita GDP. The
next group consists of various measures of public health - - average mortality rate, average
life expectancy and the Malaria Ecology variable constructed by Kiszewski et al. (2003)
and used by Sachs (2003). Next we included a variety of policy variables that have been
suggested in the literature as possible sources of non-convergence - - openness to interna-
tional trade, an index of business regulations, the size of the government sector, the black
market premium and the average inﬂation rate. Next there is a set of variables reﬂecting
political and social stability - - ethnic fractionalization, revolutions and coups, and political
assassination. Finally there is a long list of institutional variables that might possibly be
channels through which legal origins aﬀect growth - - an index of state-owned enterprises,
bureaucratic eﬃciency, corruption, the rule of law, property rights, the risk of expropriation,
civil liberties, the average of Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton’s (1999) 6 measures of
governance, Hall and Jones’s (1999) index of social infrastructure, Bockstette, Chanda and
Putterman’s (2002) measure of length of experience with statehood, Adelman and Mor-
ris’s index of social capability as extended by Temple and Johnson (1998) and Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson’s (2001) settler-mortality variable.
TABLE 9 HERE
If our results were fragile, or if our legal instruments were working on growth and conver-
gence primarily through some channel other than ﬁnancial development then the addition
of at least some of these variables and their interaction with initial relative output should
destroy the explanatory power of F · (y − y1) in our growth regression, or make the coeﬃ-
cient βf on F signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. But the results of Table 9 show otherwise.
32This is what happens when human capital passes a threshold value in the model of Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes (2002).
27The estimated sign of the coeﬃcient βfy on F · (y − y1) remains negative in all cases. It
is also statistically signiﬁcant in all cases except when the alternative variable is settler
mortality, a case in which the number of observations is quite small and multicollinearity
of the instruments makes the parameter estimates unreliable.
We explored this single exception further by pooling the 38 ex-colonial countries for
which we have data on settler mortality with the other 33 countries (non-ex-colonies) in
our dataset, so as to raise the sample size to 71. We set settler mortality equal to zero
for the non-ex-colonies and included in the regression a dummy for non-ex-colony and an
interaction between this dummy and initial relative output. This formulation assumes that
being an ex-colony has an eﬀect on growth and convergence but not on the growth eﬀects of
having more ﬁnancial intermediation. The results are displayed in the last column of table 9.
They conﬁrm implication 1, to the eﬀect that the direct coeﬃcient of private credit should
be zero, and suggests that the only exception in Table 9 to the ﬁnding of a signiﬁcantly
negative value of the interaction coeﬃcient βfy may be attributable to a small sample bias,
which the analysis of this paragraph has sought to correct.
Also, according to Table 9 in all cases the coeﬃcient βf of F remains not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero when these alternative variables are included in the regression. Moreover,
the only case in which the interaction between an alternative variable and initial relative
output was statistically signiﬁcant was that of bureaucratic eﬃciency, which came in with
the wrong sign, indicating that convergence is less likely with a more eﬃcient bureaucracy.
We interpret these results as a further indication that lack of ﬁnancial development
accounts for the failure of some countries to converge to the growth rate of the global
technology frontier, a further corroboration of our theory, and a further indication of the
validity of our legal origins instruments. If some factor other than ﬁnancial development is
primarily responsible for determining a country’s convergence status then that other factor
must not be one that is represented by any of the commonly cited explanatory variables
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5C o n c l u s i o n
The paper has developed and tested a Schumpeterian model of cross country convergence
with ﬁnancial constraints. The model is consistent with the broad facts of convergence
and divergence since the 19th Century. It implies that all countries above some critical
level of ﬁnancial development should converge in growth rates, and that in such countries
ﬁnancial development has a positive but eventually vanishing eﬀect on steady-state GDP.
These implications were tested by estimating a cross-country growth regression with an
interaction term between ﬁnancial intermediation and the country’s initial relative output.
As predicted, the coeﬃcient of this term is negative and highly signiﬁcant, and the direct
eﬀect of ﬁnancial intermediation is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
33When we re-estimated the coeﬃcients in Tables 8 and 9 using the GMM procedure indicated in footnote
26 above the direct eﬀect of ﬁnance became statistically signiﬁcant in 5 of the regressions with institutional
variables, and the interaction terms with three alternative institutional variables became statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 10 percent level, but never at the 1 percent level. However, the main implication of the
theory continued to be supported by the results: speciﬁcally, the crucial interaction coeﬃcient βfy remained
negative at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level in all cases except again that of settler mortality.
28Why some countries fail to converge in growth rates despite the possibility of technology
transfer has been a puzzle. In combination with the theoretical results of Howitt (2000),
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) our theoret-
ical results show that Schumpeterian growth theory provides a framework for analyzing a
variety of forces that contribute to nonconvergence. Our empirical results suggest that ﬁ-
nancial development is among the most powerful of these forces, especially considering that
educational attainment, initial relative output and a large number of other candidate vari-
ables do not have an analogous eﬀect when included in the same regression with ﬁnancial
intermediation.34
A further test of the theory would be to examine the sectoral composition of innovation
across countries with diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial development. Financial development should
be especially favorable to innovation in R&D-intensive sectors, where technology transfer
requires much external ﬁnance. In future work we plan to test for industry-speciﬁce ﬀects of
ﬁnancial development much the same way that Rajan and Zingales (1998) did, except using
R&D intensity rather than their more general measure of dependency on external ﬁnance.
34Our results suggest that a country might escape divergence by using FDI as a substitute for lending
to local entrepreneurs. However, the results of Alfaro et al. (2003) suggest that FDI and local ﬁnance are
complements. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁn dt h a tF D Ih a sas i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on growth only when interacted with
ﬁnance. This is consistent with the view that FDI results in technology transfer only when complemented
by the local entrepreneurial investments at the heart of our theory, which investments are impeded by lack
of ﬁnancial development.
29TABLE 1 : Split-Sample Regressions ( Two-way )
Constant F y - y 1
Top half  -0.020   0.020*     -1.615***
(-0.02) (1.98) (-4.33)
Bottom half 0.579     0.095*** 0.619
(0.50) (2.73) (1.67)
Dependent variable is average growth rate of per-capita GDP 1960-1995. Estimation by OLS.
F is average private credit 1960-1995, y - y 1 is log per-capita GDP 1960 relative to the United States.
Sample size is 71 countries. Sample split according to values of F. (t-statistics in parentheses)
*** significant at 1% level
 ** significant at 5% level
  *  significant at 10% level
TABLE 2 : Split-Sample Regressions ( Three-way ) 
Constant F y - y 1
Top third  1.208 0.004      -1.759***
(1.31) (0.37) (-5.16)
Middle third  -2.274     0.119** -0.285
(-1.29) (2.66) (-0.67)
Bottom third -0.685     0.154** 0.347
(-0.39) (2.78) (0.61)
Dependent variable is average growth rate of per-capita GDP 1960-1995. Estimation by OLS.
F is average private credit 1960-1995, y - y 1 is log per-capita GDP 1960 relative to the United States.
Sample size is 71 countries. Sample split according to values of F. (t-statistics in parentheses)
*** significant at 1% level
 ** significant at 5% level
  *  significant at 10% level
30Table 3 : First-Stage Regressions using Legal Origins as Instruments
Dependent variable F F F (y - y 1) F (y - y 1)
Const   59.95***  
(7.07)
   96.63***   
(3.43)
-28.50**    
(-2.53)
-14.59      
(-0.39)
Eng 6.40       
(0.55)
-30.28      
(-1.04)
5.33       
(0.55)
-8.59       
(-0.22)
Fre -6.06       
(-0.51)
-42.74      
(-1.46)
-0.38       
(-0.02)
-14.30      
(-0.36)
Ger    52.85*** 
(3.44)
16.17      
(0.52)
12.96      
(0.63)
-0.96       
(-0.02)
Eng (y - y 1)   18.90***   
(4.53)
-53.60      
(-1.01)
 12.59**    
(2.27)
-14.92      
(-0.21)
Fre (y - y 1)   15.44***   
(3.32)
-57.06      
(-1.07)
6.01       
(0.97)
-21.50      
(-0.30)
Ger (y - y 1)   20.95**    
(2.31)
-51.56      
(-0.96)
  61.83***   
(5.14)
34.32      
(0.47)
 y - y 1 72.50      
(1.37)
27.51      
(0.39)
adjusted R
2 0.56 0.57 0.40 0.39
p-value of F test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Estimation by OLS. Sample size is 71 countries. (t-statistics in parentheses)
F is average private credit 1960-95.
y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States.
Eng, Fre, Ger are respectively indicators of English, French and German legal origins.
The null hypothesis of the F test is that the coefficients of all regressors other than y - y 1 are zero.
*** significant at 1% level
 ** significant at 5% level
  *  significant at 10% level

























Constant   2.07**  2.85*  1.85* 0.60   1.69**   1.97**   1.74** 3.75     2.20***     2.71***    2.07*** 3.06
(2.06) (1.84) (1.79) (0.04) (2.36) (2.16) (2.29) (0.71) (3.43) (3.26) (2.89) (0.94)
F -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01
(-0.93) (-1.04) (-1.07) (0.00) (-0.23) (0.11) (-0.11) (-0.22) (-1.29) (-1.07) (-0.96) (-0.29)
y - y 1     1.51***     2.65***    1.89*** 7.17   0.79**   0.97**    0.81** 0.57     1.30***    1.62***    1.35***  2.42*
(3.14) (3.12) (3.57) (1.04) (2.29) (2.02) (2.11) (0.25) (4.05) (3.81) (3.74) (1.68)
F (y - y 1)    -0.06***    -0.08***    -0.08*** -0.11    -0.04***    -0.02**    -0.03*** -0.00    -0.05***    -0.04***    -0.05***  -0.03*
(-5.35) (-3.68) (-5.07) (-1.29) (-3.71) (-2.48) (-3.14) (-0.01) (-7.02) (-4.74) (-5.94) (-1.81)
1
st-stage p: F 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1
st-stage p: F (y-y
1) 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p of Sargan test 0.57 0.25 0.86 0.97
R
2 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.23
# obs 71 71 71 71 60 58 60 65 71 71 71 71
Notes: Dependent variable: average growth rate of per-capita real GDP, 1960-1995.
F is average Financial Intermediation 1960-95, y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States.
 (t-statistics in parentheses)
*** significant at 1% level
 ** significant at 5% level
  *  significant at 10% level
IV using Legal Origins IV using Initial Values OLS
32 
Table 5: Robustness to Alternative Conditioning Sets 








Private credit Empty 































































Notes: Dependent variable: average growth rate of per-capita GDP 1960-1995. ( t-statistics in parentheses)
y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States.
F is average financial intermediation 1960-1995.
Estimation by IV using legal origins and legal origins interacted with y - y 1 as instruments for F and F (y - y 1)
a y - y 1
b empty set plus schooling 1960.
c basic set plus government size, inflation, black market premium and openness to trade.
d policy set plus indicators of revolutions and coups, political assassinations and ethnic diversity. 
*** significant at 1% level
33Table 6: Convergence Club Membership
1 Probably converges 2 Uncertain convergence 3 Probably diverges
Switzerland Iceland Liberia
Japan Venezuela Syrian Arab Republic
United States Trinidad & Tobago Nepal
Sweden Chile Haiti
Netherlands Senegal Ghana





























Notes: Financial development decreases, and hence the estimated convergence parameter increases,
as you move down each list and then to the right.
*The estimated convergence parameter is negative (indicating convergence) in countries above (and
including) the Philippines and positive (indicating divergence) in countries below the Philippines.











a -0.004       
(-0.43)




b -0.007       
(-0.77)




c -0.008       
(-0.75)




d -0.009       
(-0.78)





Empty  -0.002       
(-0.19)
-0.052 ***    
(-3.59)
0.14 66
Basic  -0.000       
(-0.01)
-0.053 ***    
(-3.64)
0.12 66
Policy  -0.004       
(-0.30)
-0.051 ***    
(-3.53)
0.25 63
Full  -0.002       
(-0.13)
-0.052 ***    
(-3.22)
0.21 63
Notes: Dependent variable: productivity growth rate 1960-95.
F is average private credit 1960-1995.  
lna - lna 1 is the log of productivity in 1960 relative to the United States.
Estimation by IV using legal origins and legal origins interacted with lna - lna 1
as instruments for F and F (lna - lna 1).  (t-statistics in parentheses)
a lna - lna 1
b empty set plus schooling 1960.
c basic set plus government size, inflation, black market premium and openness to trade.
d policy set plus indicators of revolutions and coups, political assassinations and ethnic diversity. 
*** significant at 1% level
 35Table 8: Test for Other Interactions (Part 1)
X = Empty y - y 1 School 60 Sec hy gschool ghy
F -0.015 -0.015 -0.017 -0.019 -0.001 -0.015 -0.005
(-0.93) (-0.71) (-0.86) (-1.01) (-0.07) (-0.88) (-0.40)
F (y - y 1)     -0.061***     -0.061***     -0.061***     -0.057***     -0.041***     -0.061***     -0.043***
(-5.35) (-4.05) (-3.70) (-3.71) (-3.36) (-4.90) (-3.65)
X 1.711 0.158 0.442 0.910 0.229 0.328
(0.97) (0.96) (0.96) (0.44) (0.55) (0.46)
X (y - y 1) 0.063 0.027 0.211 -1.836 0.036 -0.464
(0.15) (0.19) (0.61) (-1.30) (0.22) (-1.18)
Sargan 
test p-
value 0.57 0.57 0.45 0.59 0.15 0.61 0.88
#  obs 71 71 71 69 70 71 70
Notes: Dependent variable: average growth rate of per-capita GDP 1960-1995.
F is average private credit 1960-1995. 
y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States.
Estimation by IV using legal origins and legal origins interacted with y - y 1
as instruments for F and F (y - y 1). (t-statistics in parentheses)
*** significant at 1% level
 ** significant at 5% level
  *  significant at 10% level
 36Table 9: Test for Other Interactions (Part 2)
X = Africa Eq.  Dist. pop100cr tropop avgmort avgexpect me trade Bus. reg. gov bmp pi avelf revc assass
F -0.008 -0.120 -0.015 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.006 -0.013 -0.010 -0.020 -0.018 -0.016 -0.011 -0.020 -0.019
(-0.48) (-0.70) (-0.89) (-0.70) (-0.61) (-0.51) (-0.38) (-0.83) (-0.64) (-1.19) (-0.94) (-0.83) (-0.63) (-1.15) (-1.21)
F (y - y 1)  -0.053***  -0.046***  -0.063***  -0.053***  -0.046***  -0.047***  -0.046***  -0.062***  -0.052***  -0.067***  -0.065***  -0.060***  -0.056***  -0.063***  -0.062***
(-4.34) (-2.98) (-4.62) (-4.05) (-3.09) (-3.10) (-3.83) (-5.27) (-3.71) (-5.34) (-4.97) (-4.68) (-4.21) (-5.22) (-5.47)
X -0.973 1.270 -0.849 -0.470 -0.006 0.090 0.048 0.007 -0.300 0.124 -0.017 -0.007 1.013 -2.836 -0.700
(-0.55) (0.58) (-0.56) (-0.40) (-1.62) (1.15) (0.31) (0.38) (-0.50) (1.48) (-1.00) (-0.26) (0.52) (-1.12) (-0.73)
X (y - y 1) 0.229 -1.105 -0.265 0.271 0.001 0.005 0.049 0.001 -0.247 0.067 -0.008 -0.003 0.952 -1.539 -0.169
(0.29) (-0.66) (-0.38) (0.43) (0.26) (0.13) (0.83) (0.09) (-0.68) (1.27) (-1.00) (-0.17) (0.97) (-1.13) (-0.28)
Sargan p-
value 0.39 0.59 0.66 0.78 0.41 0.40 0.57 0.73 0.38 0.58 0.77 0.55 0.33 0.58 0.68
# obs 71 70 67 67 64 64 67 66 66 64 67 71 71 71 71
X= soe bureau corrupt rulelaw pr.rights exprisk civil lib. kkz infra statehist socap setmortal  setmortal
a
F -0.014 -0.018 -0.023 -0.019 -0.016 -0.022 -0.014 -0.024 -0.028 -0.015 -0.066 -0.011 -0.021
(-0.76) (-0.76) (-1.08) (-0.91) (-0.77) (-0.95) (-0.69) (-1.02) (-1.08) (-0.82) (-1.50) (-0.11) (-1.03)
F (y - y 1)  -0.056***  -0.060***  -0.058***  -0.054***  -0.055***  -0.053**  -0.057***  -0.061***  -0.062***  -0.055***  -0.079*** -0.110     -0.060***
(-4.05) (-3.59) (-3.54) (-3.03) (-2.68) (-2.19) (-3.58) (-2.91) (-2.85) (-4.51) (-2.53) (-1.22) (-4.24)
X 0.080 0.571* 0.231 0.533* 0.452 0.900* -0.212 1.012 3.88 0.058 0.695 0.012 0.001
(0.32) (1.69) (0.99) (1.98) (0.68) (1.98) (-0.63) (1.30) (1.33) (0.04) (0.53) (0.61) (0.11)
X (y - y 1) 0.068 0.401* 0.103 0.237 0.230 0.345 0.043 0.321 0.895 -0.812 -0.095 0.004 0.001
(0.47) (2.00) (0.73) (1.29) (0.50) (0.95) (0.25) (0.60) (0.46) (-1.05) (-0.19) (0.67) (0.23)
Sargan p-
value 0.37 0.95 0.65 0.89 0.36 0.88 0.84 0.71 0.76 0.87 αα 0.77
#  of obs 66 38 66 42 66 42 70 70 69 67 40 38 71
Notes: Dependent variable: average growth rate of per-capita GDP 1960-1995. ( t-statistics in parentheses) F is average private credit 1960-1995.
y - y 1 is the log of per-capita GDP in 1960 relative to the United States. See Appendix D for description of other variables.
α: In these cases multicollinearity forced Stata to drop some of the instruments.
aSample augmented to include non-ex-colonies, as described in the text.
*** significant at 1% level
 ** significant at 5% level
  *  significant at 10% level
Political-social stability
Institutions
Geography Health Policy variables
37Appendix A: Slower convergence
In this Appendix we indicate how the theoretical analysis would be changed if the
innovation technology took the more general form:
At (i)=
½
bAt +( 1− b)At−1 with probability µt





0 At(i)di is again the average domestic productivity at date t and b is a real
number between 0 and 1. The basic model of the text assumes an extreme special case of
(30), namely b =1 .
As before, the equilibrium innovation probability µt will be the same across all interme-
diate sectors, so we can integrate (30) over all sectors i to produce the following dynamic
equation for average productivity:
At = µt[bAt +( 1− b)At−1]+( 1− µt)At−1,
or equivalently
At = µtbAt +( 1− µtb)At−1. (31)
We shall maintain the assumption that the R&D cost is proportional to the technological
target, so that we now have
nt−1 = e n(µt)[bAt +( 1− b)At−1],
where as before
e n(µt)=ηµt + δµ2
t/2.
We ﬁrst look at the perfect credit market case, and then we turn our attention to the case
where ﬁrms are credit-constrained.
Perfect credit markets: In this case, the equilibrium innovation rate µt will be chosen
so as to maximize the expected net payoﬀ:
βµtπ[bAt +( 1− b)At−1] − e n(µt)[bAt +( 1− b)At−1].
We thus get
µt = µ∗ ≡
βπ− η
δ
as before. Putting this into (31), dividing both sides by At and updating, we see that
distance to the frontier now evolves according to:




which is the same as the evolution equation (8) in the text, except with µ∗b replacing µ∗.





38which is strictly lower than when b =1 .
Credit constrained ﬁrms: In this case, the equilibrium innovation rate µt solves:
max
µt
{βµtπ[bAt +( 1− b)At−1] − e n(µt)[bAt +( 1− b)At−1]}
subject to the credit constraint:






(1 + r)(1− α)ζ
(1 + r − c)(1+g)
.











so that µt = e µ(ω(c)ξ(at−1)), where as before:
e µ(n)=
p
η2 +2 δn− η
δ
.
The credit constraint in turn will bind whenever
at−1 < e a(c),
where the critical value e a(c) satisﬁes:
µ∗ = e µ(ω(c)ξ(a)).
In that case from (31) we obtain that at will be determined over time according to:
at = e µ(ω(c)ξ(at−1))b +
(1 − e µ(ω(c)ξ(at−1))b)
1+g
at−1 ≡ e F2 (at−1).
From here on, the convergence analysis will remain qualitatively the same as in our basic
framework. In particular, using the fact that


























i nw h i c hc a s et h ec o u n t r y ’ sa s y m p t o t i cg r o w t hr a t ew i l lb e :
b G =( 1+g) e F0
2(0) − 1=( 1+g)ω(c)/η ∈ (0,1).
Comparison with the results at the end of section 3.1 in the text shows that the conditions
for membership in group 3 and the asymptotic growth rate within that group are exactly
t h es a m ea si nt h ec a s eo fb =1 .
Appendix B: Endogenous size of innovations
Suppose that an innovator at date t − 1 can target any productivity level Bt(i)=Bt
less than or equal to the frontier technology At at date t. In line with our basic model,
the R&D cost of achieving Bt with probability µt is assumed to be equal to e n(µt)Bt. Now,
consider an innovator who is investing a given amount Nt−1 on innovation. If she targets
the productivity level Bt, her innovation probability µt will be:




On the other hand the post-innovation proﬁt if productivity level Bt is achieved equals:
e π(Bt)=πBt.





Because the innovation function e µ has an elasticity less than one, therefore expected














Therefore whatever amount Nt−1 is being invested the entrepreneur will choose to target the
highest possible technology level: Bt = At. It follows that targeting At is optimal not only
for a credit constrained entrepreneur but also for an entrepreneur with access to unlimited
funds at the rate of interest r, because in either case if
³
e N, e Bt
´
is the optimal choice of
(Nt−1,B t) then e B must be the optimal choice of Bt given that Nt−1 = e N.
40Appendix C: Approximating the model with the estimated equation
In this appendix we show how our estimation equation (23) can be derived from a









e µ(ωat) if ωat <n ∗
µ∗ = e µ(n∗) otherwise
¾
,
ω is the ﬁnancial multiplier deﬁned by (14) in the text, and the innovation function e µ,
deﬁned by (11) in the text, is increasing and strictly concave.
Now, let us consider the same dynamic equation (32), but where we replace the kinked
function µ(ωa) by a function λ(ωa) which is very similar but not kinked. To be consistent
with implication 2 of section 3.2 above, suppose that λ is strictly increasing for all values
of ωa up to a1ω1,w h e r eω1 is the leader’s ﬁnancial multiplier and a1 is the leader’s initial
normalized productivity, but that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial innovation just vanishes for the
leader. That is:
1. λ is strictly concave with
λ00(ωa) ≤−  <0
for all ωa ≤ a1ω1;
2. λ is inﬁnitely diﬀerentiable and
3. λ0(ωa)=0for ωa ≥ a1ω1.





















Using a second-order Taylor expansion, we can approximate G in the neighborhood of
the frontier point (ω1,a 1) as:
G(ω,a) ∼ =

     
     
G(ω1,a 1)+Gω(ω1,a 1)(ω − ω1)+Ga(ω1,a 1)(a − a1)
+1
2Gωω(ω1,a 1)(ω − ω1)2
+1
2Gaa(ω1,a 1)(a − a1)2
+Gωa(ω1,a 1)(ω − ω1)(a − a1)

     
     
,
41where the subscripts on G denote partial derivatives. This in turn can be reexpressed as a




∼ = lna − lna1.
We thus obtain the convergence equation:
G(ω,a) ∼ =

    
    
G(ω1,a 1)+Gω(ω1,a 1)(ω − ω1)+a1Ga(ω1,a 1)∆
+1
2Gωω(ω1,a 1)(ω − ω1)2
+1
2(a1)2Gaa(ω1,a 1)∆2
+a1Gωa(ω1,a 1)(ω − ω1)∆

    
    
.
After substituting for G and its partial derivatives at (ω,a)=( ω1,a 1),u s i n gt h ef a c t
that
λ0(ω1a1)=0and λ(ω1a1)=µ∗




       



















a1 − 1)(ω − ω1)∆.

       
       
. (34)
In particular: (i) the direct coeﬃcient of (ω − ω1) is equal to zero because it is propor-





is strictly negative because
λ00(ω1a1) ≤−  <0.
The equation (23) that we have estimated diﬀers from (34) in three respects. First it
uses the ﬁnancial intermediation variable F instead of ω. Since F is a linear transformation
of ω35 this does not alter the form of the equation. Second, it uses the log of per-capita GDP
(y) instead of the log of productivity (lna). Third it omits the pure quadratic terms, in ∆2
35From our discussion in Section 3.3, we know that the ratio F of intermediary lending to GDP, which is










42and (ω − ω1)
2 . The sign restrictions (i) and (ii) derived above are precisely the restrictions
(27) and (29) that we have tested for in our interaction analysis.
M o r e o v e r ,w h e nw ee s t i m a t et h ef u l lq u a d r a t i ce q u a t i o nw eﬁnd that the restrictions
(27) and (29) are again satisﬁed, and that the coeﬃcients on the pure quadratic terms in












b F b y−0.382
(−1.23)
b y2
(t-statistics in parentheses, sample size 71, OLS regression - dependent variable is average
growth rate of per-capita GDP 1960-95). In this sense our estimated equation can be
thought of as the second-order approximation (34) to our model without the insigniﬁcant
pure quadratic terms.
Appendix D: Sources and Description of Data
setmortal: Log of European settler mortality, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
statehist: Measure of the antiquity of a state (1 to 1950 CE) regarding the existence
of native foreign government and the extent of the territory ruled by this government.
The measure used corresponds to statehist5 of the database in Bockstette, Chanda and
Putterman (2002).
avgexpect: Average life expectancy at birth for the years 1960-1990, Children Data Bank
for International.
socap: Measure of social capability deriving by Adelman and Morris (1967) using assess-
ment of each country’s development as of 1957-1962 in a variety of respects such as: extent
of urbanization, extent of dualism, extent of social mobility, extent of literacy, crude fertility
rate, degree of modernization of outlook, character of basic social organization, extent of
mass communication, size of traditional agricultural sector and importance of indigenous
middle class, Temple and Johnson (1998).
infra: Measure of social infrastructure (1986-1995) computed as the average of the GADP
and an openness measures. GADP is an index of government antidiversion policies includ-
ing law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and government
repudiation of contracts, Hall and Jones (1999).
avgmort: Average under-5 mortality rate for the years 1970-1990, Children Data Bank for
International.
pop100cr: Percentage of population within 100 km of ice-free coast, CID at Harvard
University. General Measures of Geography.
tropop: Percentage of population in geographical tropics, CID at Harvard University.
General Measures of Geography.
kkz: Composite index of six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political
stability and absence of violence, government eﬀectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,
control of corruption, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999).
me: Malaria Ecology. An ecologically-based variable that is predictive of the extent of
malaria transmission (Kiszewski et al., forthcoming). Malaria is intrinsically a disease of
warm environments because a key part of the life cycle of the parasite (sporogony) depends
on a high ambient temperature. Malaria also depends on adequate conditions of mosquito
43breeding, mainly pools of clean water, usually due to rainfall ending up in puddles, cisterns,
discarded tires, and the like. Additionally, the intensity of malaria transmission depends
on the speciﬁc mosquito species that are present. The basic formula for Malaria Ecology
combines temperature, mosquito abundance, and mosquito vector type. The underlying
index is measured on a highly disaggregated sub-national level, and then averaged for the
entire country and weighted by population, TheE a r t hI n s t i t u t ea tC olumbia University.
bureau: An average of three indices published by Business International Corporation
(1984): eﬃciency of the judiciary system, red tape and corruption. The averages are over
the period 1980-1983.
exprisk: Expropriation risk. Assessment of risk of “outright conﬁscation” or “forced
nationalization”. It ranges from 0 to 10, with lower scores indicating a higher risk and
data are averaged over 1982-1995, Knack and Keefer (1995).
lat_abst: Distance from the equator scaled between 0 and 1, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) - henceforth LLSV (1998).
pr. rights: Property rights. Rating of property rights on a scale from 0 to 5. The more
protection private property receives, the higher the score, LLSV (1998).
soe: Index of state owned enterprises (SOE). Measures the role of SOEs in the economy,
ranging from 0 to 10. Higher scores denote countries with less government owned enterprises,
which are estimated to produce less of the country’s output, LLSV (1998).
corruption: Measure of corruption, with the scale readjusted from 0 (high level of corrup-
tion) to 10 (low level). Data are averaged over 1982-1995, Knack and Keefer (1995).
assass: Number of assassinations per 1000 inhabitants, averaged over 1960-1990, Banks
(1994).
revc: Revolutions and coups. A revolution is deﬁned as any illegal or forced change in the
top of the governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful
armed rebellion whose aim is independence from central government. Coup d’Etat is deﬁned
as an extraconstitutional or forced change in the top of the governmental elite and/or its
eﬀective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year. Unsuccessful coups are not
counted. Data are averaged over 1960-1990, Banks (1994).
avelf: Ethnic fractionalization. Average value of ﬁve indices of ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization, with values ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values denote higher levels of
fractionalization, Easterly and Levine (1998).
rulelaw: Measure of the law and order tradition in a country. It is an average over 1982-
1995. It ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition,
LLSV(1998).
bus. reg: Business regulation. Rating of regulation policies related to opening and keeping
open a business. The scale is from 0 to 5, with higher scores meaning that regulations are
straightforward and applied uniformly to all businesses and that regulations are less of a
burden to business, LLSV (1998).
civil: Index of civil liberties, Freedom House 1994.
legal origins: Dummy variables for British (Eng), French (Fre), German (Ger) and Scan-
dinavian legal origins, LLSV (1998).
private credit: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t) + F(t-1) Pe(t-1) ]}/[GDP(t)/ Pa(t)], where F is credit
by deposit money bank and other ﬁnancial institutions to the private sectors (lines 22d +
42d), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line 64) and Pa is the average CPI for the
44year, IFS.
bank assets: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t) + F(t-1) Pe(t-1) ]}/[GDP(t)/ Pa(t)], where F is domestic
assets of deposit money banks (lines 22a-d), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line
64) and Pa is the average CPI for the year, IFS.
liquid liabilities: {(0.5)*[F(t)/Pe(t) + F(t-1) Pe(t-1) ]}/[GDP(t)/ Pa(t)], where F is liquid
liabilities (line 55), GDP is line 99b, Pe is end- of period CPI (line 64) and Pa is the average
CPI for the year, IFS.
commercial-central bank: DBA(t)/(DBA(t) + CBA(t)), where DBA is assets of deposit
money banks (lines 22a-d) and CBA is central bank assets (lines 12a-d), IFS.
bmp: Black market premium: Ratio of black market exchange rate and oﬃcial exchange
rate minus one, Picks’ Currency Yearbook through (1989) and the World Currency Year-
book.
sec: Average years of secondary schooling in the population over 15 from 1960-1995, Barro
and Lee (1996).
school: Average years of schooling in the population over 25 in 1960, Barro and Lee (1996).
pi:I n ﬂation rate. Log diﬀerence of consumer price index average from 1960-1995, IFS (line
64).
trade: Openness to trade. Sum of real exports and imports as a share of real GDP average
1960-1995, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000), henceforth LLB.
gov: Government expenditure as a share of GDP average 1960-1995, LLB (2000).
africa: Dummy for countries in the African continent.
y-y1:D i ﬀerence between log per-capita real GDP 1960 in each country and the USA, LLB
(2000).
gschool: Average annual growth rate of schooling from 1960 to 1995, LLB (2000).
hy: 1985 human-capital to output ratio, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997).
ghy: 1960-1985 annual growth rate of human capital to output ratio, Klenow and Rodríguez-
Clare (1997).
lna - lna1: The log of productivity in 1960 relative to the USA. For multi—factor produc-
tivity the data come from Benhabib and Spiegel (2002). For total-factor productivity we
deﬁne the log of productivity as 1.5×[log per-capita GDP - (log per-capita capital)/3] -
0.7×(average years of schooling), using data from LLB (2000).
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